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We present a protocol for quantum cryptographic network consisting of a quantum network center
and many users, in which any pair of parties with members chosen from the whole users on request
can secure a quantum key distribution by help of the center. The protocol is based on the quantum
authentication scheme given by Barnum et al. [Proc. 43rd IEEE Symp. FOCS’02, p. 449 (2002)].
We show that exploiting the quantum authentication scheme the center can safely make two parties
share nearly perfect entangled states used in the quantum key distribution. This implies that the
quantum cryptographic network protocol is secure against all kinds of eavesdropping.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been consid-
ered as a method for the perfectly secure communication
which can compensate for the incompleteness of the clas-
sical cryptography. Since the advent of the first QKD
protocol presented by Bennett and Brassard [1], various
kinds of quantum cryptographic protocols based on QKD
schemes between two users [2, 3, 4] have been proposed,
and the rigorous proofs of the security of the protocols
have considerably been studied [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
This implies that quantum cryptography has almost at-
tained to the practical stage.
The QKD protocol between two users can be general-
ized into the communications between two parties, A and
B, consisting of several members respectively [13, 14],
which use the quantum secret sharing protocol [15].
For the communication among a lot of users, the the-
ories on the quantum cryptographic network, in which
several protocols are feasible on request, have been sug-
gested [16, 17, 18]. The quantum cryptographic network
usually requires a quantum network center, which con-
nects any pair of parties by entangled states so that the
two parties can perform a quantum key distribution by
help of the center.
Furthermore, employing the quantum network center,
one can reduce the number of quantum channels used
in quantum cryptographic network. In other words, in
order for any pair of n users to communicate with each
other, n(n−1)/2 quantum channels between any pairs of
users are required in the quantum cryptographic network
without a quantum network center, while only n quan-
tum channels between the center and users are required
in the quantum cryptographic network with a quantum
network center. Therefore, the center’s role can provide
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us with the efficient quantum cryptographic network as
well as the secure network.
In this paper, we present a protocol for the quan-
tum cryptographic network, which is based on the quan-
tum message authentication scheme presented by Bar-
num et al. [19]. In order to show that the quantum
cryptographic network protocol is secure, we first gen-
eralize the quantum authentication scheme between two
persons into the scheme between any pair of parties, and
then prove that exploiting the quantum authentication
scheme the center can safely make any pair of parties
share nearly perfect entangled states used in the QKD so
that the protocol is secure against all kinds of eavesdrop-
ping.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we
briefly introduce the multipartite entangled states used
in the QKD between two parties and their properties. In
Sec. III we present two protocols for the quantum crypto-
graphic network. In Sec. IV we show that our protocols
is secure against any eavesdropping. Finally, in Sec. V
we summarize our results.
II. MULTIPARTITE ENTANGLED STATES
AND THEIR PROPERTIES
For a positive integer j, we define
∣∣Φ±j 〉 and ∣∣Ψ±j 〉 by
∣∣Φ±j 〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣0j〉± ∣∣1j〉) ,
∣∣Ψ±j 〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣0j〉± ι∣∣1j〉) , (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the spin-up and the spin-down in
the z-direction respectively, and ι =
√−1. Then we can
readily obtain the following decomposition relations [14]:
2A B
YA ⊕ YB YA Y¯A ⊕MA YB Y¯B ⊕MB
∣∣Φ+n 〉 even even
0
even
0
1 1
odd
0
odd
1
1 0
TABLE I: The relations between the measurement outcomes
of two parties A and B.
C A B
YC Y¯C ⊕MC YA Y¯A ⊕MA YB Y¯B ⊕MB
∣∣Φ+n 〉
0
0
even
0 (1)
even
0 (1)
1 0 (1) 1 (0)
0
odd
0 (1)
odd
1 (0)
1 0 (1) 0 (1)
1
0
even
0 (1)
odd
1 (0)
1 0 (1) 0 (1)
0
odd
0 (1)
even
1 (0)
1 0 (1) 0 (1)
TABLE II: The relations between the measurement outcomes
of three parties A, B, and C.
For positive integers n and m satisfying n > m,
∣∣Φ±n 〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣Φ+m〉∣∣Φ±n−m〉+ ∣∣Φ−m〉∣∣Φ∓n−m〉)
=
1√
2
(∣∣Ψ+m〉∣∣Ψ∓n−m〉+ ∣∣Ψ−m〉∣∣Ψ±n−m〉) ,
∣∣Ψ±n 〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣Φ+m〉∣∣Ψ±n−m〉+ ∣∣Φ−m〉∣∣Ψ∓n−m〉)
=
1√
2
(∣∣Ψ+m〉∣∣Φ±n−m〉+ ∣∣Ψ−m〉∣∣Φ∓n−m〉) . (2)
We consider the case that each member of two parties
A and B, consisting of m and n −m users respectively,
possesses one particle of an n-particle state |Φ±n 〉, and
that each member measures one’s own particle in the x-
or y-direction. For a party P (with l members), let YP be
the number (modulo 4) of members of P who measure in
the y-direction, Y¯P = ⌊YP /2⌋, and MP the sum (mod-
ulo 2) of the measurement outcomes of all members in
P . Then we straightforwardly obtain the following prop-
erties from Eq. (2): If YP is even, then MP ⊕ Y¯P is zero
(or one) when they share
∣∣Φ+l 〉 (or ∣∣Φ−l 〉), where ⊕ is the
addition modulo 2. If YP is odd, then MP ⊕ Y¯P is zero
(or one) when P has the state
∣∣Ψ+l 〉 (or ∣∣Ψ−l 〉).
Hence, we get the relations between outcomes of two
parties and three parties as in the Table I and II, re-
spectively. It follows from these relations that not only
the QKD between any kinds of two parties, but also the
QKD between two parties with a center’s assistance are
feasible if they share the multi-particle entangled states
such as |Φ+n 〉 [14].
III. PROTOCOLS FOR QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPHIC NETWORK
In this section, we construct two slightly different pro-
tocols for quantum cryptographic network according as
the center has a memory to store quantum information
or does not have such a memory. If the center has the
memory, then it can enhance the efficiency for the use
of entangled states by reducing the number of discarded
entangled states.
Before presenting our protocol, we briefly review the
results of the quantum message authentication presented
by Barnum et al. [19]: The quantum authentication uses
stabilizer codes based on a normal rational curve in the
projective geometry. Barnum et al. proved that the set of
the codes forms a stabilizer purity testing code with error
ε = 2r/(2s + 1), where each code encodes t = (r − 1)s
qubits into u = rs qubits, and also showed that a secure
quantum authentication scheme can be obtained from the
purity testing code.
A. Protocol 1: QKD network without memory
We now present the QKD protocol between two users
or two parties which can securely be performed by help
of the center’s authentication for their states. Through-
out the paper, we assume that C is considered as one
quantum network center which is always trustful, and
that A and B are two arbitrary parties which want to be
connected by nearly perfect entangled states in order to
communicate each other. The protocol is as follows:
(1) Preprocessing: For each member µ in A and B,
C and µ agree on some stabilizer purity testing
code {Dk(µ)} and some private and random binary
strings k(µ), x(µ), and y(µ).
(2) C prepares nt qubits in the state |Φ+n 〉⊗t. We de-
note one qubit of |Φ+n 〉 which will be transmitted
to the member µ by ρ(µ).
(3) Performing some specific unitary operations corre-
sponding to x(µ), C encrypts ρ(µ)⊗t ≡ ρ˜(µ) as
τ(µ).
(4) For the code Dk(µ) with syndrome y(µ), C encodes
τ(µ) according to Dk(µ) to produce σ(µ). C sends
σ(µ) to the member µ. Let σ′(µ) be the state which
µ receives.
(5) Each member µ measures the syndrome y′(µ) of
the code Dk(µ) on σ
′(µ). Each member µ compares
y(µ) to y′(µ) and aborts if any error is detected.
3(6) According to Dk(µ), each member µ decodes σ
′(µ)
to obtain τ ′(µ), and decrypts τ ′(µ) using x(µ), and
then obtains a t-qubit state, ρ˜′(µ).
(7) µ randomly performs a measurement on each qubit
of one’s own state in the x- or y-direction.
After each member individually carries out the
above steps, each member in two parties takes t
bits as measurement results. Thus, in order to ob-
tain sufficiently many bit strings, C and the two
parties repeat the above steps as many times as
necessary.
(8) For all shared qubits, each member in two parties
publicly announces the used directions, but not the
obtained results. Then the two parties, A and B,
obtain YA and YB. If YA ⊕ YB is odd then they
discard the keys. Otherwise, A and B continue the
next step.
(9) A collector in A (B), gathers the outcomes to ob-
tain MA (MB).
(10) Two parties A and B have a public discussion on a
random subset of the obtained bits, which is used
as the test bits, in order to detect an error which
may occur in the previous procedure.
If the parties find an error in this step, all shared
keys are discarded, and they go back to Step (1).
Otherwise, they obtain a final key string.
We remark that the steps (9) and (10) are unnecessary
when both of two parties A and B consist of only one
member.
We now review a method to obtain MA (or MB) pre-
sented in [14]: We first assume that all members are or-
dered and that the first member is the collector. This
order need to be arbitrary. The collector chooses a ran-
dom bit, which we will express as ‘R’, adds it to his
outcome modulo 2, and transfers the result to the second
member. The second member transfers the next member
the outcome plus the received one modulo 2. All mem-
bers continue this procedure until the collector receives
MA⊕R (orMB⊕R). Then the collector obtainsMA (or
MB), which isMA⊕R⊕R (orMB⊕R⊕R). However,
anyone cannot knowMA (orMB) without acquiring the
results of all members.
B. Protocol 2: QKD network with memory
In here, we introduce the protocol in which the center
does not only authenticate quantum states but also joins
in the procedure of the QKD scheme so that the entan-
gled states employed in QKD can efficiently be used. The
protocol can be obtained from modifying several steps in
Protocol 1 as follows:
(2′) C prepares (n+1)t qubits in the state
∣∣Φ+n+1〉⊗t. C
stores t-qubit state ρ(C)⊗t ≡ ρ˜(C) in his memory
where ρ(C) is one qubit of
∣∣Φ+n+1〉.
(7′) Each member in the two parties, except the center
C, randomly performs a measurement on each one
qubit in the x- or y-direction.
(8′) (a) Each member in the two parties, except the
center C, publicly announces the used direc-
tions, but not the obtained results. Then A,
B, and C obtain YA and YB .
(b) According to the values of YA and YB , C per-
forms a measurement on his particle which is
in the state ρ(C) so that Y¯A⊕MA and Y¯B ⊕
MB have a correlation or an anti-correlation.
(9′) Two parties, A and B, collect the outcomes to ob-
tain MA and MB respectively, as in the previous
protocols. Then the center C reveals the obtained
results.
We remark that the entangled states are used in Proto-
col 2 more efficiently than in Protocol 1 since there are
cases that the keys are discarded in Step (8) of Protocol 1
while there is not such a case in Step (8′) of Protocol 2.
IV. PROOF OF SECURITY OF QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPHIC NETWORK
In this section, we are going to prove the security of
the protocols presented in this paper. We first note that
if, in Step (2′) of Protocol 2, C measures each qubit of
ρ˜(C) in the x- or y-direction instead of storing it then the
protocol is essentially equivalent to Protocol 1, and that
the order of the measurement does not affect the security
of the protocol. Thus, it suffices to prove the security of
Protocol 2.
The secure quantum authentication scheme in [19] en-
sures that for any t-qubit state ρ˜, when ρ˜ is transmitted
to a member µ as ρ˜′, the fidelity F of ρ˜ and ρ˜′ is not
less than 1 − ε0 for sufficiently small ε0 > 0, where the
fidelity F of X and Y is defined by
F (X,Y ) = tr
(√
X1/2Y X1/2
)2
. (3)
Here, ρ˜′ can be considered as Λµ(ρ˜) for some quantum
channel Λµ. Thus, if the transmitted state is not dis-
carded, then for any t-qubit ρ˜ we can obtain the inequal-
ity
F (ρ˜, ρ˜′) = F (ρ˜,Λµ(ρ˜)) ≥ 1− ε0. (4)
For the detailed proof, we present a remark on a prop-
erty of the fidelity and the quantum channel presented in
Lemma 3 of Ref. [20]: Let E be a quantum operation on a
d-dimensional quantum system HA, and |Ψ〉 ∈ HA⊗HR
4a purification of a state ρA on HA, where HR is a refer-
ence system such that trR(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) = ρA. Suppose that
there is ε > 0 such that
〈ψ|E(|ψ〉〈ψ|)|ψ〉 ≥ 1− ε (5)
for all |ψ〉 in the support of ρA. Then
〈Ψ| [(E ⊗ IR) (|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)] |Ψ〉
≥ 1−
(
1 + d0 ·max
j 6=k
{pjpk}
)
ε, (6)
where d0 is the Schmidt number of |Ψ〉 and √pj are the
Schmidt coefficients of |Ψ〉 with respect to the bipartite
quantum system HA ⊗HR.
Since for any member µ there exists a sufficiently small
ε1 > 0 such that
F (|ψ〉〈ψ|,Λµ(|ψ〉〈ψ|)) ≥ 1− ε1 (7)
for all t-qubit state |ψ〉 by the inequality (4) and
∣∣Φ+n+1〉⊗t = 1√
2t
2t−1∑
j=0
|j〉µ|jn〉C , (8)
applying the above remark to our situation, we obtain
the following property:
F (Φ, (Λµ ⊗ IC) (Φ)) ≥ 1−
(
1 +
1
2t
)
ε1 (9)
where Φ =
(∣∣Φ+n+1〉〈Φ+n+1∣∣)⊗t.
As we discuss the details in Appendix,
⊗
µ Λµ is also
a nearly perfect quantum channel and hence there is a
sufficiently small ε2 > 0 such that
F
(
|ξ〉〈ξ|,
⊗
µ
Λµ(|ξ〉〈ξ|)
)
≥ 1− ε2 (10)
for any nt-qubit pure state |ξ〉. Thus, since it follows
from Eq. (8) that
∣∣Φ+n+1〉⊗t = 1√
2t
2t−1∑
j=0
|jn〉AB|j〉C , (11)
when the center transmit nt qubits of the states to all
members, we can obtain the almost same inequality:
F
(
Φ,
(⊗
µ
Λµ ⊗ IC
)
(Φ)
)
≥ 1−
(
1 +
1
2t
)
ε2. (12)
Therefore, after executing Step (6), the parties with the
center share the nearly perfect entangled states.
We now need a result of Lo and Chau [6] that if the cen-
ter C and every members share a state having a fidelity
exponentially close to 1 with |Φ+n 〉⊗t then Eve’s mutual
information with the key is at most exponentially small.
From this result, we can directly notice that Protocol 2 is
secure if there are no dishonest members in the parties.
For the analysis of the case that dishonest members
exist in the parties, we use the investigation presented
in [14]. By a classical probability estimate about the
random sampling tests [7], if there are some errors in the
procedure then two parties can detect an error with high
probability from sufficiently many test bits. We remark
that each member can have an effect on the protocol just
at the moment of announcing the basis or giving the in-
formation on the outcomes, and that the test bits are
chosen after the directions are announced and the infor-
mation on the outcomes is transferred to other members.
Therefore, since the test bits are randomly chosen, the
dishonest members cannot escape the detection, that is,
they cannot prevent the others from obtaining the correct
keys without being detected.
V. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have presented a protocol for quan-
tum cryptographic network consisting of a quantum net-
work center and many users, in which any pair of parties
with some members can secure a quantum key distribu-
tion by help of the center. We have shown that exploiting
the quantum authentication scheme the center can safely
make two parties share nearly perfect entangled states
used in the QKD on request. We have also shown that
the quantum cryptographic network protocol is secure
against all kinds of eavesdropping.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we show that
⊗
µ Λµ is also a nearly
perfect quantum channel and that there is a sufficiently
small ε2 > 0 such that
F
(
|ξ〉〈ξ|,
⊗
µ
Λµ (|ξ〉〈ξ|)
)
≥ 1− ε2 (A.1)
for any nt-qubit pure state |ξ〉.
First we note that the last term of the inequality (6) is
greater than or equal to 1−(1 + d/4) ε since d0pjpk ≤ d/4
5for all j 6= k. Thus, in the property of the fidelity and
the quantum channel presented in Lemma 3 of Ref. [20],
if there is ε > 0 such that
〈ψ|E(|ψ〉〈ψ|)|ψ〉 ≥ 1− ε (A.2)
for all |ψ〉 ∈ HA, then
〈Φ| [(E ⊗ IR) (|Φ〉〈Φ|)] |Φ〉 ≥ 1−
(
1 +
d
4
)
ε, (A.3)
for all |Φ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HR. Since the square root of the
fidelity F is doubly concave [22], that is, for
∑
j λj = 1√√√√√F

∑
j
λjρj , λjρ′j

 ≥∑
j
λj
√
F
(
ρj , ρ′j
)
, (A.4)
it follows from the inequality (A.3) that if the inequal-
ity (A.2) holds then for all density matrices ρAR on
HA ⊗HR
F (ρAR, (E ⊗ IR) (ρAR)) ≥ 1−
(
1 +
d
4
)
ε. (A.5)
Hence, we obtain from the inequalities (9) and (A.5) that
F (Φ, (Λµ ⊗ IC) (Φ)) ≥ 1−
(
1 + 2t−2
)
ε1 (A.6)
and that
F ((Iµ ⊗ Λµ′ ⊗ IC) (Φ) , (Λµ ⊗ Λµ′ ⊗ IC) (Φ))
= F (ρ, (Λµ ⊗ Iµ′C) (ρ))
≥ 1− (1 + 2t−2) ε1 (A.7)
for µ 6= µ′, where ρ = (Λµ′ ⊗ IµC) (Φ).
We now present a simple remark on a relation between
the fidelity and a distance of density matrices, D, which
is defined by D(̺, ̺′) = tr|̺− ̺′|/2 [22]: For any density
matrices ̺ and ̺′, the following inequalities hold.
1−
√
F (̺, ̺′) ≤ D(̺, ̺′) ≤
√
1− F (̺, ̺′). (A.8)
Then it follows from the inequality (A.8) and the triangle
inequality of D that for density matrices ̺, ̺′, and ̺′′
1−
√
F (̺, ̺′′) ≤D(̺, ̺′′) ≤ D(̺, ̺′) +D(̺′, ̺′′)
≤
√
1− F (̺, ̺′) +
√
1− F (̺′, ̺′′).
(A.9)
By virtue of the inequalities (A.6), (A.7), and (A.9),
we obtain the followings: for any nt-qubit pure state |ξ〉,
√√√√F
(
|ξ〉〈ξ|,
⊗
µ
Λµ(|ξ〉〈ξ|)
)
≥ 1− n
√
(1 + 2t−2)ε1.
(A.10)
Since ε1 is independent on n and t, the proof is com-
pleted. Furthermore, it is clear that the result similar to
the inequality (12) can directly be obtained in the same
way.
Considering the Bures metric dB [23, 24] defined by
dB(ρ, ρ
′) =
√
2− 2F (ρ, ρ′)1/2, (A.11)
since dB satisfies the triangle inequality we can actually
obtain an inequality tighter than the inequality (A.9):
For density matrices ̺, ̺′, and ̺′′,√
1− F (̺, ̺′′)1/2 ≤
√
1− F (̺, ̺′)1/2
+
√
1− F (̺′, ̺′′)1/2. (A.12)
Therefore, from the inequality (A.12), we could also ob-
tain an inequality tighter than the inequality (A.10).
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